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RETHINKING THE "NATIONAL ORGAN
TRANSPLANT PROGRAM: WHEN PUSH
COMES TO SHOVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Human organ transplantation is no longer considered experimental
medicine.' An individual's chance of surviving with a transplanted organ
is greater than ever before; "[t]ransplant patients not only survive, but
also return to their families and communities to lead active, productive
lives."2 More than 36,000 people are currently waiting for an organ trans-
plant in the United States, 3 and each day at least six more of them die
before an organ becomes available.4 Of those presently waiting for major
organ transplants such as a liver or a heart, one third will die before re-
ceiving the needed transplant.5 Even more alarming, "[t]he shortage of
pediatric organ donors is so severe that 30% to 50% of children younger
than the age of 2 who are registered for transplantation will die while
1. Organ Transplantation: A New Chance at Life, REGARDING WOMEN AND
HEALTHCARE, (Fairfax Hospital, Falls Church, VA), Spring 1994, at 1; see also Don Col-
bum, Changing the Life and Death Rules of Transplants, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993,
(Health Section) at Z10 (stating that "as proficiency improves, more and more patients
become candidates for lifesaving transplants").
2. Organ Transplantation: A New Chance at Life, supra note 1, at 1. Improved tech-
niques and more effective immunosuppressive drugs have made organ transplantation a
safe, accepted therapy with some procedures boasting success rates of above 80%. Mar-
lene R. Matten et al., Nurses' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Beliefs Regarding Organ and Tis-
sue Donation and Transplantation, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 155, 157 (Mar.-Apr. 1991).
3. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING (UNOS), FACTS ABOUT TRANSPLANTA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 22, 1994) (copy on file with J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y). This number includes the more than 26,000 persons waiting for a kidney, 3,700
waiting for a liver, 2,800 waiting for a heart, and 1,500 waiting for a lung. Id. See generally
Tei Randall, Too Few Human Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in Need... and the
Gap Widens, 265 JAMA 1223, 1223 (1991) (stating that the total number of persons on the
national organ waiting list stood at approximately 22,000 in 1991); Matten, supra note 2, at
155 (stating a similar statistical breakdown by organ type from 1991).
4. Colburn, supra note 1, at Z10. In addition, there are approximately 50,000 individ-
uals who continue to survive on suboptimal therapy while waiting to receive a transplant.
See Roger W. Evans et al., The Potential Supply of Organ Donors: An Assessment of the
Efficiency of Organ Procurement Efforts in the United States, 267 JAMA 239, 239 (1992).
5. Stuart Younger, M.D. & Ronald Arnold, M.D., Ethical, Psychosocial, and Public
Policy Implications of Procuring Organs from Non-heart Beating Cadavers, 269 JAMA
2769, 2769 (1993).
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waiting for a donor organ to become available." 6
Tragically, the shortfalls are not the result of an inadequate supply of
available organs.7 Indeed, if more efficiently utilized, the available organ
donor pool may adequately meet current transplant needs.8 However,
traditional methods9 of accessing the potential donor pool have proven
ineffective'" as the annual number of organ donors remains at approxi-
mately 4,000 in the United States." In light of this unmet demand, the
failure of traditional methods of organ procurement requires an examina-
tion of nontraditional means of increasing the potential-to-actual donor
ratio,'2 and the development of alternative sources of possible transplant
organs.'3
Proposed methods for increasing the potential-to-actual organ procure-
ment ratio include routine request laws,' 4 presumed consent,' 5 a national
6. John A. Morris et al., Pediatric Organ Donation: The Paradox of Organ Shortage
Despite the Remarkable Willingness of Families to Donate, 89 PEDIATRICS 411, 411 (1992).
7. Evans, supra note 4, at 239. "[A]t a minimum something on the order of 12,000
hearts and livers and 24,000 kidneys are potentially available for transplantation." Lloyd
Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989).
8. Evans, supra note 4, at 245. It is estimated that 34,000 potentially available kid-
neys, and 17,000 potentially available hearts, livers, lungs and pancreata are lost each year.
Matten, supra note 2, at 155.
9. Traditional organs for transplant are procured from a "brain dead" individual after
the "death" of the individual has occurred. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769.
10. Evans, supra note 4, at 239. The actual donor supply has remained virtually un-
changed except for an increase of 9.1% in 1990. Id. The efficiency of current organ pro-
curement stands between 37% to 59%. Id. However, the actual organs available for
transplant may dip even with an increase in efficiency because, by some estimates, the
potential pool of donors is shrinking. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769.
11. George P. Smith II, Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for Procuring Human
and Cadaveric Organs: When the Price is Right, 1 MED. L. INT'L 17, 17 (1993).
12. See George Kolata, Panel Ponders Organ Procurement Problem, 250 JAMA 455,
455 (1983); Smith, supra note 11, at 18; see also Controversial Solutions to Organ Donation
Crisis to be Addressed at Regional Forum, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting an upcoming meeting of healthcare profes-
sionals to discuss alternative methods of organ procurement and the increase of interest in
the area of alternative solutions).
13. See Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769 (discussing the growing interest in
turning to alternative sources for organ procurement as a result of frustration with current
approaches).
14. Matten, supra note 2, at 156. The effectiveness of routine request laws has been
the subject of debate. Compare Dr. James Prottas, Shifting Responsibilities in Organ Pro-
curement: A Plan for Routine Referral, 260 JAMA 832 (1988) (arguing for the implemen-
tation of routine request protocols) with Robert Falcone et al., Organ Procurement, 261
JAMA 380, 380-81 (1989) (despite their full scale implementation of routine request proto-
cols, the authors "have not seen the optimistic family response quoted by [Dr. Prottas] in
consenting to the harvest of vital organs").
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organ draft,'6 and financial incentives. 7 Alternative transplant organ
sources include animal organs,'" living donor transplants,19 partial trans-
plants in the case of livers and lungs,2" retrieval from anencephalic in-
fants,2 and "non-heart-beating" cadaver donors.22 Unfortunately for
those who could benefit from the potential increase via utilization of the
nontraditional approaches, the organ transplant process is one of the
"most morally-tinged area[s] of health care," 3 causing even the mere
consideration of these nontraditional methods and sources to be contro-
versial.24 Nevertheless, the possibility of reducing the number of needless
deaths that result from the organ shortage compels the examination of
nontraditional sources.
Of particular controversy are proposals which use economic mecha-
nisms as a means to encourage organ donation.25 Federal law currently
prohibits financial gain on the part of the organ donor.26 The primary
concern is that such programs would turn the human body into a com-
modity27 and lead to the inequitable distribution of transplant organs-a
result deemed unsatisfactory by most.28  But mandating reliance upon
15. Dilips Kittur et al., Incentives for Organ Donation?, 338 THE LANCET 1441, 1442
(Dec. 1991).
16. B.D. Colen, A National Plan for Providing Organs, NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1991, at 69.
17. Rorie Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 32.
18. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769.
19. Id. See also Smith, supra note 11, at 21 (stating that living donors have been used
in organ transplantation since World War II).
20. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769.
21. Kathleen Nolan, Anencephalic Infants: A Source of Controversy, Oct.-Nov. 1988,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., at 5. This is one of the most important sources to receive current
attention because of the extreme lack of transplant organs available to infants. See Morris,
supra note 6, at 412. This source, however, is also one of the most resisted. Cf. Norman
Fost, Organs From Anencephalic Infants: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, Oct.-
Nov. 1988, HASTINGS Cmr. REP., at 15.
22. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2769. Non-heart beating donors are not com-
monly used because of fears of organ quality degradation. Id.
23. Colburn, supra note 1, at Z10; see Evans, supra note 4, at 239; Younger & Arnold,
supra note 5, at 2771; Stuart Younger et al., Psychosocial and Ethical Implications of Organ
Retrieval, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321, 321 (1985).
24. Delthia Ricks, One Woman's Plight Reflects Organ Crisis, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIB., Oct. 14, 1991, at Al.
25. RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS 207 (1992); Kittur et al., supra
note 15, at 1442.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988) (making it illegal "for any person to knowingly ac-
quire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce").
27. See George Annas, The Paradoxes of Organ Transplantation, 78 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 621 (June 1988).
28. Bioethicists warn that the poor will be coerced financially to donate organs for the
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traditional methods of organ procurement as a means to ensure the equi-
table allocation of available transplant organs already ignores the experi-
ence of many individuals within the present organ transplant system.2 9
For instance, to be placed on a waiting list for an organ, a person must be
able to pay the cost of the transplant procedure, which can approach
$250,000.30 Indeed, the current inequality of transplant opportunities be-
tween the poor and the rich is extensive, particularly with respect to
members of minority groups.31 Minorities are less likely than whites to
donate organs and to receive organ transplants.32 Minorities also have
more difficulty finding an organ match than other groups and are 10% to
20% more likely to experience organ rejection as a result of being forced
to rely on organs that do not provide a close antigen match.33
Many transplant professionals and bioethicists insist that the traditional
methods of organ procurement are altruistic in nature, and that economic
considerations would be inconsistent with such an organ transplant sys-
tem.3 4 Yet every party involved in the organ procurement and transplant
process, except for the donor, receives financial compensation. 35 More-
over, transplant hospitals routinely bill transplant patients more than
benefit of the rich and that people may even be murdered for their organs and tissues. See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 25 (questioning "whether a commercial market would en-
hance opportunities for suicides and murders and promote harveiting of the organs of
anencephalic infants before actual death").
29. There may be as many as 75,000 additional people needing transplants who do not
have the money necessary to get on the organ transplant waiting list. Scott Shepard, Dia-
mond Aims to Spark National Debate on Organ-Procurement Issue, 15 MEMPHIS Bus. J. 14
(1993).
30. Ricks, supra note 24, at Al; see generally Roger W. Evans, Money Matters, 21
TRANSPLANT PROCEEDINGS 3419 (1989) (discussing whether the ability to afford transplan-
tation should ever be a factor in allocation).
31. See generally C. Everett Koop, Increasing the Supply of Solid Organs for Trans-
plantation, 98 PuB. HEALTH REP. 566 (Nov.-Dec. 1983).
32. Marcia Dunn, Doctors Work to Overcome Reluctance Among Blacks to Donate
Organs, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1987, at 21. In Washington D.C., more than 60% of the
kidney dialysis patients are black. Id. Sixty percent of the people who receive transplants
there are white, making the rate of organ transplants for whites there nearly double the
rate for blacks. Id.
33. See id.; see also Evans, supra note 4, at 245 (discussing the problems associated
with immunologic considerations and donor selection criteria).
34. See, e.g., Edmund Pellegrino, Families' Self-interest and the Cadaver's Organ, 265
JAMA 1305 (1991); Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 25, at 207; Smith, supra note 11, at 25
("religious views and traditions ... regard the body as a gift of God and man's rights in it
as merely those of a steward with no correlative rights of ownership"); Kittur et al., supra
note 15, at 1442.
35. Ronald Bailey, Should I Be Allowed to Buy Your Kidney?, FORBES, May 28, 1990,
at 365.
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twice the hospital's organ acquisition cost 6 without being perceived as
acting in conflict with the spirit of altruism. 7
It must also be recognized that lack of compensation to the donor for
his or her "gift of life" does not reduce transplantation costs for the do-
nee."8 Instead, the donor's gift provides a financial incentive to organ
procurement organizations (OPO) to acquire more organs.3 9 It is a suc-
cessful incentive. Regional OPOs are now beginning to compete with
one another for individual organ acquisitions in order to realize greater
economies of scale40 and to develop marketing techniques to sell "broth-
erhood like soap" in an effort to increase their proportional share of
available organs.4
In response to this reality, many medical and legal professionals advo-
cate revision of the existing organ donation system and its statutory un-
derpinnings to allow the impact of financial incentives on the supply of
transplant organs to be studied.42 For example, a panel of the National
Kidney Foundation recently announced that ethical and legal considera-
36. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial In-
centives, 269 JAMA 3113, 3115 (1993). This figure is in addition to the hospital, surgical,
and other fees. Id. "Viewed generously, organ recipients and payers on their behalf are
being asked to cross-subsidize [through the markup] other worthy causes in which trans-
plant hospitals engage." Frank Sloan, Organ Procurement: Expenditures and Financial In-
centives, 269 JAMA 3155, 3155 (1993).
37. Sloan, supra note 36, at 3155; Evans, supra note 36, at 3113; see also Roger D. Blair
& David L. Kasserman, Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403,
412 (1991) (believing that the current problem is primarily an economic one).
38. Evans, supra note 36, at 3117. Whatever savings result from the donor's charitable
"gift of life" is absorbed by the OPO in its organ acquisition cost markup. Id.
39. Id. at 3116. "A single multiorgan donor can save multiple lives and generate con-
siderable revenue [for the OPO] as each recipient is separately billed for each donor or-
gan." Id.40. Bill Lumbricoid, Battle is Shaping Up in Congress Over Organ Procurement Rules,
ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATcH, June 24, 1993, at 8A. This occurs when an OPO sets up a
procurement relationship with a hospital in another OPO's region. Id.
41. Raymond L. Horton, Marketing the Concept of Becoming a Potential Organ Do-
nor, 11 J. HEALTH CARE MKTG. 36,40 (Sept. 1991). When you talk somebody into buying
your brand of soap, in the end he has a bar of soap. With public service, in the end, he has
only the psychic reward. Id. This sells a humanitarian act like a traditional product de-
fined by the frequently used slogan, "the gift of life." Id. But cf Pellegrino, supra note 34,
at 1305 ("Altruism is not a value [that can be] imposed on donor families. No one can be
coerced into altruism because altruism requires a free and conscious recognition of other
persons in the way we conduct ourselves.").
42. Be Open to New Ways to Spur Organ Donations, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 1991, at
10A; Dr. Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ
Donation, 265 JAMA 1302, 1302-03 (1991); Evans, supra note 4, at 239; see also Bailey,
supra note 35, at 365 (proposing solutions including payment to families of deceased
donors).
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tions should not necessarily preclude consideration of financial compen-
sation as a method to increase consent to organ donation.43 Nor is the
bulk of public opinion adverse to the idea of compensating an organ do-
nor in order to increase donation rates." According to Dr. Wesley Alex-
ander, chairman of the United Network of Organ Sharing donations
committee, "[W]hen push comes to shove, the public has to make a deci-
sion as to whether they would rather see people die on dialysis while
leading a fairly dissatisfying life ... or to allow the buying and selling of
human organs." 45
This Comment examines the ethical guidelines and state model codes
regarding the organ procurement process including: The Unified Ana-
tomical Gift Act (1968)46 and its 1987 revision; 47 The National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984;48 and the proposed Organ Transplant Program
Reauthorization Act of 1993.49 Based upon ethical, legal, and financial
considerations, this Comment recommends amending The National Or-
gan Transplant Act to authorize the United States Department of Health
and Human Services to sponsor a series of pilot programs, through the
United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS), which would employ limited
financial incentives for organ donations as part of the present national
organ allocation program." This Comment argues that such a series of
programs, if conducted in the recommended manner, would be consistent
with both the letter and the spirit of the current national organ transplant
program.
43. James Warren, A Literal Gift of Life, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, (Special Section)
at 14. See also Smith, supra note 11, at 26 ("[Tlhe verifiable benefits of sustained life that
accrue to participating donees of non-commercial organ sales outweigh the moral fears or
costs of using this mechanism as an inducement for stimulating the market for transplant-
able organs.").
44. Warren, supra note 43, at 14. Only 22% of those polled opposed compensation.
Five percent thought it would cause abuse within the system, while two percent feared it
would create a black market. Physicians, when polled, were found to be firmly opposed to
the idea by as much as 80% of those surveyed. "[A] telephone survey of 1,000 Americans
taken for Time magazine in June [1991] suggests that health professionals and ethicists may
be out of touch with the public's attitude on the matter." Id. at 15; see also Smith, supra
note 11, at 28 ("Forced altruism ... does not have a practical history for dealing with the
problems of the day.").
45. Bailey, supra note 35, at 372.
46. 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993) (amended Supp. 1994).
47. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993) (amended Supp.
1994).
48. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2342 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-
274e (Supp. IV 1992)).
49. S. 1597, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
50. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSIDERATIONS
A. Ethical Considerations Regarding Organ Procurement
and Allocation
Two rules are generally accepted as fundamental to an ethical organ
procurement process.5' First, "vital organs should only be taken from
dead patients, and, correlatively, living patients must not be killed by or-
gan retrieval." 2 Second, "the care of living patients must never be com-
promised in favor of potential organ recipients., 53 In order to resolve the
health care practitioner's possible conflict of interest between the poten-
tial donor and the potential recipient, a strict separation must always be
maintained between the medical staff responsible for the transplantation
process and those caring for the dying patient. 4 If an increase in trans-
plantable organs can be obtained in accordance with these rules, then
attaining that increase should be the goal of public policy.55
In addition, transplant organs, as a scarce medical resource, should be
allocated in an effective, efficient, and equitable manner.56 This is best
accomplished when organ donation is prioritized57 through a combination
of egalitarian and utilitarian principles 58 that balance the length of time a
person has been waiting for a needed organ and the urgency of that
need59 against the probability of success for the transplant procedure.6"
51. Younger & Arnold, supra note 5, at 2771.
52. Id. This is known as the "dead donor rule." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Beth Gaze, Resource Allocation: The Legal Implications, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 91 (1993) (analyzing the levels of decisionmaking involved in scarce resource
allocation).
57. Smith, supra note 11, at 26; see Evans, supra note 4, at 245 (describing the
problems faced by immunologic incompatibility).
58. Smith, supra note 11, at 26; see generally, George P. Smith II, Triage: Endgame
Realities, 1 J. CoNTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (1985) (discussing the ethical and philo-
sophical principles applied in triage); James R. Childress, Some Moral Connections Be-
tween Organ Procurement and Organ Distribution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 85
(1987).
59. Egalitarian theory seeks to maintain or restore the equality of those in need.
Smith, supra note 11, at 26.
60. Id. This is an example of utilitarianism, which attempts to achieve the maximum
efficiency available from a scarce resource..
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B. State Considerations Regarding Organ Procurement and Allocation
1. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws61 (NCCUSL) drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968
(UAGA of 1968) to serve as a guideline to state governments of princi-
ples and procedures for the donation and receipt of transplant organs.
62
Under the UAGA of 1968, any competent adult has the choice to permit,
specify, or forbid the use of his body and organs for transplantation, re-
search, or educational purposes after his death.63 Consent to organ dona-
tion is accomplished by a testamentary instrument, such as a will, or a
nontestamentary writing, such as a donor card.' In the absence of memo-
rialized intent, a decedent's next of kin can make the final determination
of donation consent. 65 Any such person acting in good faith in accord-
ance with the UAGA of 1968's guidelines for granting third-party consent
is immune from civil liability or criminal prosecution. 6 In addition, the
decedent may specify a particular use for his organs or identify a specific
donee.67
The UAGA of 196868 intentionally omitted all reference to the role of
financial incentives in the organ procurement process.69 The NCCUSL's
drafters believed that until the impact of incentives to donate were felt
"the matter should be left to the decency of intelligent human beings.",
70
This omission regarding financial incentives made the UAGA of 1968 less
controversial and, therefore, more likely to be adopted by the states.
71
61. "The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
was organized in 1892 to promote uniformity of state law." Ann McIntosh, Comment, Reg-
ulating the Gift of Life, 65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 171 n.8 (1990).
62. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1968) § 1, 8A U.L.A. 63, 64 (1993) (amended
Supp. 1994); Note, Regulating The Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1015
(1985).
63. UNIF* ANATOMICAL GiFr Acr (1968) § 2.
64. Id. § 4. However, "even if the decedent has a signed donor card on his person at
the time of death, physicians will almost never retrieve organs without the permission of
the next of kin." Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1519, 1619 (1990).
65. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr AT (1968) § 2.
66. Id. § 7.
67. Id. § 4; Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1617 n.16; see also Note, supra
note 62, at 1016-17.
68. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1968) §§ 1-7.
69. Note, supra note 62, at 1017.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. See McIntosh, supra note 61, at 176. In contrast, the 1987 UAGA was the subject
of controversy, particularly regarding its required request provisions, and has not been
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By 1973, all fifty states and the District of Columbia enacted the UAGA
of 1968.72 However, the organ deficit continued despite this unanimous
endorsement.73
2. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987
The ineffectiveness of the UAGA of 1968 in alleviating the transplant
organ shortage prompted the drafting of a new Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act in 19877" (UAGA of 1987). The UAGA of 1987 expressly awarded
priority to the donors over objections from the donors' next of kin,75 sim-
plified the requirements for creation of a valid donor card,76 and banned
commercial transactions involving cadaverous organ acquisition.77 The
UAGA of 1987 also required medical personnel to request consent for
organ donation from all suitable patients or their next of kin if the patient
has not made this decision.78
The UAGA of 1987 has not replaced the UAGA of 1968 in many
states79 primarily because states object to the priority of donor consent.8"
Therefore, at present most state laws do not prohibit transplant organ
sales.8 ' Moreover, prior to adopting the UAGA of 1968, several of the
state laws banning organ sales were repealed with the adoption of the
UAGA of 1968, which did not itself address organ commerce.82
enacted in most states.. See UNri. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1987) § 5, 8A U.L.A. 19, 47
(1993) (amended Supp. 1994).
72. Cohen, supra note 7, at 6.
73. Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1617 (discussing how the UAGA of
1968 standardized the organ procurement process but did not increase the organ supply).
74. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 19, 20 (1993)
(amended Supp. 1994).
75. Id. § 2(h).
76. Id. § 5. Even though a signed donor card is usually legally binding transplants still
normally do not occur without the surviving family's consent, even in states that have
adopted the UAGA of 1987. Id.
77. Id. § 10.
78. Id. § 5.
79. Only 10 states had enacted the UAGA of 1987 by 1991. Peters, supra note 42, at
1304.
80. McIntosh, supra note 61, at 176. Resistance to the UAGA of 1987 is also due to
controversy surrounding both the routine request provisions and the prohibition on organ
sales. Id
81. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1987), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993) (amended Supp. 1994); Note, supra note 62, at 1023.
82. Note, supra note 62, at 1023.
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C. Federal Considerations Regarding Organ Procurement and
Allocation
1. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act
83
(NOTA of 1984) to alleviate the scarcity of transplant organs and to im-
prove donor-recipient matching through a national system of organ pro-
curement and distribution.' Congress attributed the low rate of organ
donation and inefficient organ allocation to poor organization and lack of
a national transplant organ system, 5 and sought a solution through im-
provements in organ donation, procurement, and distribution.8 6 The
NOTA of 1984 was intended to "strengthen the ability of the nation's
health care system to provide organ transplants, 87 by developing proce-
dures for the establishment of a nationwide organ network capable of
responding to and quickly implementing future considerations of organ
procurement and allocation policy. 88 To aid in that objective, the NOTA
of 1984 directed the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to establish a nationwide Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network89 (OPTN). The objective of the OPTN was to pro-
vide a central computer registry of potential transplant recipients to
facilitate the distribution of organs among regional organ procurement
organizations (OPOs) throughout the country.9" The United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a transplant organ registry that predated the
83. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2342 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-
274e (Supp. IV 1992)); see also Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 1, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (authorizing
the statute to be cited as "The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984").
84. H.R. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 7 (1983); cf S. REP. No. 382, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3977 (stating that the grow-
ing number of public appeals for organs necessitated Congressional action).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 575, supra note 84, at 7. The Senate Conference Committee
Report stated that the small number of medical centers able to perform organ transplants
is a limiting factor of efforts to boost transplant rates. S. REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at 2,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3976.
86. H.R. REP. No. 575, supra note 84, at 8.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 6-7.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Even though established by Congress and
reliant upon Congressional funding for continued operation, the OPTN was intended to be
established in the private, not public, sector. S. REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at 15, re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3981.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2). The OPTN was also intended to educate physicians regard-
ing organ donations and to act as an informational center for organ transplants and dona-
tions within the United States. Id.
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NOTA of 1984, was chosen to administer the OPTN.91 In addition, the
NOTA of 1984 authorized HHS to establish a national system of regional
OPOs9 and financially assist them in matching donated transplant organs
with suitable recipients. 93 The NOTA of 1984 also directed HHS to es-
tablish the Task Force on Organ Procurement (Task Force).9 4 The Task
Force was directed to aid HHS by "conduct[ing] comprehensive examina-
tions of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented
by human organ procurement and transplantation" in an effort to de-
velop new methods of improving the national organ procurement and al-
location system.95
With one exception,96 the NOTA of 1984 did not regulate the national
organ system. 97 Organ transplant centers were not required to partici-
pate in the national organ transplant system through the OPTN which,
while central in nature, served only to coordinate the decentralized organ
procurement and distribution system.98 "To the extent that other ave-
nues of donation and procurement were available and more attractive,
transplant centers and their patients were free to utilize those other
sources and resources as well." 99
91. James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplant Policy: A Time for Reassessment, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451, 463 (1989). UNOS was originally a central computer registry of
potential kidney recipients. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a) (Supp. IV 1992). To qualify as an OPO, an agency must, among
other things, (1) be non-profit; (2) be qualified to receive Medicare reimbursement for
kidney transplants; (3) serve a geographic area large enough to include at least 50 organ
transplant donors a year; (4) have agreements with most of the medical facilities in its area
capable of performing transplant procedures; (5) participate in the Organ Procurement
Transplant Network and act in concert with its standards; and (6) comply with the statuto-
rily required public and professional representations of its board of directors. 42 U.S.C.
§ 273(b); see also Blumstein, supra note 91, at 463.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a). The provision authorizing grants to OPOs amounted to ap-
proximately $70 million outlayed to the OPOs in 1984. Cohen, supra note 7, at 8.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 273. The Task Force was comprised of 25 members: 9 physicians or
scientists who specialize in human organ transplantation, 3 non-physician organ transplant
specialists, 4 experts in law, theology, ethics, or health care financing, 3 members of the
general public, and 2 medical insurance specialists, the Surgeon General of the United
States, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, the Commissioner of the Food and
Drug Administration, and the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration.
42 U.S.C. § 273.
95. Id. The Task Force was required to submit its findings and recommendations to
HHS in a final report which HHS was compelled by statute to consider. Id.
96. See 42 U.S.C § 274e (1988) (prohibiting the sale of human organs); see also Blum-
stein, supra note 91, at 465 (commenting on the dynamics of the federal ban).
97. See 42 U.S.C § 274e.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274.
99. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 464.
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The one formal regulation under the NOTA of 1984 was a prohibition
of commercial transactions involving human organs." . Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e it is currently illegal to "knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation."' 0 ' "'[H]uman organ' means the human (including fetal)
kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye bone, and
skin, [or any other organ] specified by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services by regulation.""0 2 Violation of this law constitutes a fel-
ony punishable by a fine of $50,000 and/or five years imprisonment.'0 3
This prohibition, however, "does not include the reasonable payments as-
sociated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, pres-
ervation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses
of travel, housing and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ
in connection with donation of the organ.""° Thus, hospitals in which
organs are procured and as well as the physicians who perform the surgi-
cal transplant procedures will receive financial compensation for their
services.'0 5
The scant legislative history of section 274e reveals that its enactment
was intended to avoid the "destructive impact"'1 6 that the proposed mar-
ket schemes, featuring private auction markets with transplant organs
sold to the highest bidder, would have had upon the voluntary donation
system.'0 7 Congress feared that a for-profit system would prey upon the
indigent members of our society or the Third World as a source for or-
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a); Blumstein, supra note 91, at 464.
101. 42 U.S.C § 274e. In addition, the statute's qualification of "affecting commerce"
should not be viewed as an actual limitation given that any restriction must pass only a
"rational basis" test to be valid. Cohen, supra note 7, at 8.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1). Interestingly, human blood is not included in this designa-
tion and generally has been bought and sold as commerce. See S. REP. No. 382, supra note
84, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b)(1)..
104. Id. In addition, the term "valuable consideration" has been attacked for its ambi-
guity. Questions had been raised as early as 1985 as to whether the federal statute might
ban non-cash compensation. See Note, supra note 62, at 1024 n.92.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
106. This fear aids in understanding the otherwise anomalous inclusion of the organ
sale ban within the NOTA of 1984, which is that statute's only substantive prohibition.
Cohen, supra note 7, at 8.
107. H.R. REP. No. 575, supra note 84, at 8. A physician in Virginia attempted to cre-
ate a kidney brokerage firm in 1983 with the intent of soliciting healthy persons to sell
kidneys at a market price and then retail the organs for a higher price to persons in need.
Note, supra note 62, at 1015.
When Push Comes to Shove
gans. 1°8 Section 274e, as enacted, therefore reflects the intent to prevent
the human body from being treated as a commodity.'0 9
2. The Task Force on Organ Transplantation
In 1986, the Task Force issued its report10 in which it recommended
the immediate establishment .of a national network to regulate, rather
than merely coordinate, organ acquisition and distribution in order to in-
crease organ acquisition and to improve the equity of allocation."' The
report advocated increasing public education and outreach"1 2 through the
intense advertisement of the humanitarian value of organ donation."3
The report recommended that hospitals establish a procedure of routinely
asking the immediate family of the dying individual to consider allowing
organ donation." 4 In addition, the 1986 Task Force report indicated that
organ allocation must be based on objective medical criteria, such as the
patient's need for the transplant, the probability of transplant success,
and, in cases where the candidate patient is otherwise equally medically
qualified to receive a transplant, by their length of time on the waiting
list.115 To facilitate meeting these criteria, the Task Force recommended
expanding private and public health benefit programs to include heart
and liver transplant procedures, as well as requiring Medicare and Medi-
caid to cover the cost of outpatient drug therapy for organ recipients."
6
3. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
Responding to the 1986 Task Force report, Congress included within
108. H.R. REP. No. 575, supra note 84, at 8.
109. S: REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982.
110. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERV., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1986).
111. Id. at 68.
112. Id. at xxi.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 3. "The ostensible rationale is that families, who have legal authority to
donate organs of their next-of-kin, should be given the opportunity to do a good deed for
society and to feel good about themselves by donating their dying relative's organs to the
common weal." See Blumstein, supra note 91, at 467 (citations omitted).
115. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 110, at 9-10. The Task
Force viewed donated organs as a scarce national resource which, once donated, became
public property. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 467.
116. Robert Pear, Federal Payment for Transplants for Poor Studied, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 1986, at Al. This extended coverage was estimated to cost between $42 and $70 million
each year. Id.
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the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986117 (OBRA of 1986) a
mandate that all facilities engaging in organ procurement or transplant
procedures (participating institutions) become members of the nation-
wide organ procurement and transplant network (OPTN) instituted
under UNOS by the NOTA of 1984, or forfeit their eligibility to partici-
pate in all Medicaid and Medicare programs."" This altered the role of
UNOS. Instead of merely acting as the coordinator of the Organ Pro-
curement and Transplantation Network, UNOS became the regulator of
the OPOs and transplant hospitals.'1 9 With qualification for membership
in UNOS as a prerequisite for continued transplant facility operation in
the United States, UNOS was able to adopt and maintain strict standards
and practices for membership. 2 ° No transplant hospital would risk dis-
barment of the entire hospital from Medicare or Medicaid participation
by failing to comply with UNOS's policies.' 2 '
The OBRA of 1986122 also added requirements for all participating
transplant hospitals to establish written protocols for identifying potential
organ donors, 23 notifying their regional OPO of the potential donor's
124presence, and requiring that the families of identified potential donors
be informed by the participating institution of their option to consent or
decline performance of the donation procedure. 25
4. Senate Bill 1597: The Organ Transplant Program Reauthorization
Act of 1993
On October 27, 1993, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts 126
introduced Senate Bill 1597: The Organ Transplant Program Reauthor-
117. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9318(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2009 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-8 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
118. OBRA of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
119. 53 Fed. Reg. 6525, 6528 (1988) (detailing HHS's vision of UNOS as the organ
program watchdog).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8; UNOS guidelines include strict personnel qualifications, cer-
tain minimum survival rates and stringent facility requirements. UNOS, BY-LAWS, app. B
(June 1993).
121. UNOS, supra note 120, at IV-1. UNOS requires that all transplant hospitals come
into full compliance with its standards, and if, after a short grace period, UNOS approval is
not secured, the hospital must not perform any further transplant procedures until it has
established itself as fully complying to UNOS's satisfaction. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.; see also Matten, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing nurses' unique access to
patients and their families in the context of organ procurement).
126. S. 1597, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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ization Act of 1993127 (S. 1597) into the 103rd Congress to reauthorize
the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA of 1984).128 In addi-
tion to reauthorizing the NOTA of 1984, S. 1597 attempts to improve
organ procurement by increasing public education programs that train
people in requesting donations,'129 and providing technical assistance to
organ-procuring organizations and hospitals. 3 ° Senate Bill 1597 also
seeks to alleviate the more severe organ shortages faced by minority and
other populations 131 by requiring that each regional OPO:
Evaluate annually, and report to the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network ... on the effectiveness of the organi-
zation in acquiring potentially available organs, particularly
among minority populations, and the variation of procurement
across hospitals within the organ procurement organization re-
gion, and identify a plan to increase procurement, particularly
among minority populations and other populations for which
there is a greater degree of organ shortages relative to the gen-
eral population, and at hospitals with low rates of
procurement. 32
Finally, S. 1597 requires the General Accounting Office and Office of
Technology Assessment to study numerous issues relating to organ pro-
curement and allocation, 33 to evaluate the effect of the Organ Transplant
Program Reauthorization Act of 1993 on improving the equitable alloca-
tion of organs nationwide,'134 and to issue, within two years, recommenda-
tions for improving the national organ program. 135
127. Id. § 1 (authorizing citation of the bill as the Organ Transplant Program
Reauthorization Act of 1993).
128. Organ Transplant Program Reauthorization Act of 1993: Hearings on S. 1597
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Feb. 2, 1994).
129. S. 1597 § 2(a).
130. Id. HHS would receive authorization to make grants to organ procurement orga-
nizations and other public and nonprofit institutions for the purpose of increasing organ
donations. Id.
131. Id. "[Tihe Secretary shall give priority to ... minority or other populations for
which there is a greater degree of organ shortages relative to the general population." Id.
132. Id. § 2(b)(4)(F). Programs initiated under this section of S. 1597 would receive
funding priority by HHS. Id. § 2(a).
133. Id. § 2(b)(5). This includes "the number and percentage of cadaveric organ trans-
plants for foreign nationals categorized by [OPO] and by transplant center... [as well as]
any information on the current rate of organ donation by individuals other than United
States citizens or legal residents." Id. § 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. This evaluation would be submitted directly to Congress for their considera-
tion. Id. Hearings, supra note 128, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
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However, S. 1597, in its current form, fails to address "financial incen-
tives... as a method to increase organ donation and thereby improve the
efficiency of organ procurement efforts"' 36 or to investigate the potential
for "increasing the potential organ pool by turning to alternative
sources."'
137
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of the Current State of the National Organ Transplant
Program
For all of its modifications of the NOTA of 1984, S. 1597 does no more
than continue the hope that "greater public recognition of the need for
these life-saving gifts"' 138 will be sufficient to end the continuing organ
shortage. 139 However, new questions are being raised as to the suffi-
ciency of altruism as the sole motivation for organ donation. 4° The coor-
dinated network of organ procurement and distribution of the NOTA of
1984 has not alleviated the shortage of organs.' 41 Nor has the subsequent
unification and regulation of that system, as recommended by the Task
Force Report and instituted under the OBRA of 1986, provided a solu-
tion. As previously stated, organ donation rates have, for the most part,
remained unchanged since 1989, while the demand for organ transplants
increases daily.' 42 Consequently, the organ deficit continues to ex-
pand.' 43 There were approximately 13,000 people waiting for solid-organ
transplants in 1988,144 compared to the more than 36,000 currently
waiting.145
136. Sandy Lutz, Problems Persist with Organ Donations, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Apr. 22, 1991, at 32. A panel meeting under the National Kidney Foundation's sponsorship
reported that ethical and legal considerations should not rule out the offering of payment
for organ donations. Warren, supra note 43, at 14.
137. Warren, supra note 43, at 14; see, e.g., Russell Scott, The Terrible Imbalance:
Human Organs and Tissues for Therapy-A Review of Demand and Supply, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 139, 141 (1993) (evaluating the ethical and legal obstacles in the utili-
zation of nontraditional organ sources).
138. Hearings, supra note 128, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
139. See generally S. 1597 § 2 (making no revision, in its current form, of § 274e of the
NOTA of 1984).
140. See Smith, supra note 11, at 18; Evans, supra note 36, at 3114 (exploring the poten-
tial of financial incentives to increase the rate of organ procurement).
141. See Nat Semple, Ending the Organ Grind, WASH. POST, July 11, 1993, at C4.
142. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text; Hearings, supra note 128, at 1 (testi-
mony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
143. Hearings, supra note 128, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
144. Warren, supra note 43, at 14.
145. UNOS, supra note 3, at 1.
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The pressures of transplant organ demand have affected the distribu-
tion patterns of currently available organs' 46 and caused growing dissen-
sion between local transplant facilities, the OPOs, and UNOS regarding
the equitable allocation of available transplant organs. 147 The existing
scarcity has resulted in the politicization of organ distribution, creating
opportunities for individuals with money and power.1' Indeed, a 1993
General Accounting Office report 49 found that, in violation of federal
law, present inequalities in the organ allocation system deny organs to
sicker patients and to patients who have been on organ waiting lists
longer than other equally medically qualified organ recipients.150 "The
National Organ Transplant Program has resulted in a more systematic
process for organ transplants, but problems still exist and improvements
should be made.' 15 1
B. Analysis of Proposals Involving Financial Incentives for Organ
Donation
1. Market and Nonmarket Financial Incentives
Many of the early proposals suggesting or incorporating financial in-
centives as a means of improving the rate of organ donation promoted
the establishment of organ brokerage systems that depended on market
forces of supply and demand; dealing in human organs as if they were
commercial property.1 2 Critics of these proposals for organ markets
forecast the rise of a "black market" for organs if the proposals were
146. Scott McCartney, Allocation of Organs Disregards Needs of Patients, May Break
Law GAO Says, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1993, at B6.
147. Lutz, supra note 136, at 32. Many OPOs set up relationships with hospitals outside
the region designated to them by Congress. Id.
148. The recent controversy regarding the transplant procedure performed on Gov.
Robert Casey is a case in point. See CNN Crossfire: Buying Time? (CNN television broad-
cast, June 17, 1993) (transcript on file at J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y).
149. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INCREASED EFFORT NEEDED TO BOOST
SUPPLY AND ENSURE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS, GAOIHRD-93-56 (Apr.
1993).
150. McCartney, supra note 146, at B6.
151. Hearings, supra note 128, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). This state-
ment is quoted somewhat sarcastically in the belief that it will remain applicable even after
S. 1597 becomes law.
152. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MiaC. L.
REV. 811, 857 (1970). In addition, the concept of the human body as property is not uni-
versally accepted. See Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986);
see also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991); Moore v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
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implemented.'53 Indeed, much of the impetus behind congressional en-
actment of section 274e was the fear of an unregulatable market in
human organs. 154
However, current proposals involving financial incentives pursue
nonmarket approaches for increasing procurement rates. Proposed in-
centives include coverage of funeral expenses, estate tax breaks, or col-
lege education benefits for survivors.' 5 It is important to note that such
incentives do not permit the buying or selling of organs as property, but
instead appear as alternatives to altruism in rewarding the decision to
consent to organ donation. 56
2. The Death Benefit Pilot Program
In 1991, Dr. Thomas G. Peters proposed the study of a death benefit
payment to families of potential organ donors as a means of increasing
actual organ donations and providing a more equitable allocation of or-
gans.'57 This "death benefit" is a $1,000 payment offered to the individ-
ual "who legally enables organ donation in any case where solid-organ
recovery for transplantation is completed.' 58 To prevent conflicts of in-
terest, whether on the part of the medical center or the surviving family,
no effort to obtain the organs would be made prior to the time of brain
death. 159 In addition, acceptance of the death benefit would be only an
153. Blair & Kasserman, supra note 37, at 416. This recent study of organ procurement
policies indicates that the imbalance between supply and demand encourages black market
profiteers, and that if the supply of transplant organs were increased to better meet de-
mand, black market practices would wither. Id. A similar situation exists in the adoption
field, where an excess demand for children has led, in some cases, to bribery and other
forms of coercion. See generally Elisabeth Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
the Baby Shortage, 7 J.L. STUD. 323 (1978).
154. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text; S. REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at
4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3978; see also Blumstein, supra note 91, at 465 (com-
menting on the dynamics of the federal ban).
155. Bailey, supra note 35, at 366.
156. Id.
157. Dr. Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ
Donation, 265 JAMA 1302, 1302 (1991).
Several active organ procurement organizations should test the concept of death
benefit payment in the field. If a greater number of organs are procured, a na-
tionwide program should be adopted so that a compassionately administered,
centrally controlled death benefit payment plan to families of cadaveric organ
donors is operating throughout the United States.
Id. at 1302-03.
158. Id. at 1304. "In general, the enabling individual is defined by law as the spouse,
adult son or daughter, parent, brother or sister, or legal guardian (in that order)." Id.
159. Id. at 1303.
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option, not a requirement of organ donation."6 "[N]o family would be
compelled to accept payment for recovered organs.,' 16 ' Because the goal
of the death benefit program would be to increase the actual number of
organs donated in a cost efficient manner, there would be no payment
until the actual organ recovery occurred. 62
However, under the state-adopted provisions of the UAGA of 1987,
Section 274e of the NOTA of 1984, and the current version of S. 1597, a
death benefit pilot program to study the impact of financial incentives
upon the transplant organ supply may be considered illegal. 163 More im-
portant, any transplant facility attempting to conduct such a pilot pro-
gram without government sanction would jeopardize its UNOS
membership status, thereby endangering its participation in Medicare and
Medicaid."6 Thus, this Comment recommends that Congress add a pro-
vision to the NOTA of 1984 authorizing HHS to confer grants upon its
designated OPTN for the limited purpose of planning and conducting a
death benefit pilot program. This program would further examine "organ
procurement expenditures and the role of financial incentives" in encour-
aging organ donation. 165 As part of this authority, HHS should create a
panel, similar to the Task Force created under NOTA of 1984, to indepen-
dently observe and report, either to HHS or to Congress, within a speci-
fied time period, on the rates of organ procurement under the initiated
programs, and those programs' overall cost efficiency.' 66
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Ethical Implications of the Death Benefit Pilot Program
Ethically, institution of a death benefit pilot program would neither
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1304. Payments for prior consent would lead to speculation and might give
rise to suspicion as to the inevitability of the donor's death. Id.
163. Id.
164. To remain a member of UNOS a transplant hospital must strictly maintain all
UNOS guidelines. The institution of the death benefit pilot program would constitute a
risky deviation. See generally UNOS, supra 120, at app. B.
165. Evans, supra note 36, at 3113. However, federal authorization of the death benefit
pilot program should be written so as not to prevent a state from choosing to exclude
participation of its OPOs in the death benefit program, especially those states that have
enacted versions of the UAGA of 1987.
166. This report provision would conceivably be analogous to the Task Force report and
recommendation requirement included in the NOTA of 1984. See 42 U.S.C. § 273. Alter-
natively, the report can be added to the GAO and the Office of Technology Assessment
reports which are already included as part of S. 1597. See S. 1597 § 4(b).
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degrade whatever altruistic spirit the current procurement system pres-
ently possesses nor alter the current means of organ allocation. 67 In
addition, "on ethical grounds, if everyone else involved in transplanta-
tion, the [OPO], the surgeon, the nurses, and the hospital, receive com-
pensation, why should the donor's family be excluded?' 161 Perhaps most
important, "the desire to promote a particular ethical environment
should not come at the expense of those awaiting transplantation.' 169
B. Legal Implications of the Death Benefit Pilot Program
Legally, it is indisputable that Congress intended to prevent the com-
mercialization of the human body.' 70 But there is no evidence that Con-
gress meant to prohibit all organ procurement procedures that employ
financial incentives yet operate in a non-market environment. 7' When
Congress enacted section 274e its concerns were the effect a for-profit
organ procurement system would have upon the national transplant pro-
gram, which at that time was a decentralized and unsupervised system.' 72
Congress feared that a commercial market system of organ procurement
and distribution would operate coercively, or otherwise inappropriately,
in the organ procurement process.' 73 But with the current organ procure-
ment and distribution program tightly controlled under UNOS, 7 4 such
fears of an unscrupulous market in transplant organs are unjustified. 175
167. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304. In addition, the National Kidney Foundation pro-
posed that an individual who agrees to donate his or her organs at death could receive a
financial award to his or her estate or to a previously designated beneficiary. Lutz, supra
note 136, at 34.
168. Sloan, supra note 36, at 3155. "A single multiorgan donor can save multiple lives
and generate considerable revenue as each recipient is separately billed for each donor
organ." Evans, supra note 36, at 3116.
169. Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1624.
170. 42 U.S.C § 274e; H.R. REP. No. 575; supra note 84, at 22-23; S. REP. No. 382,
supra note 84, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982.
171. H.R. REP. No. 575, supra note 84, at 22-23; S. REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at 16,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982; see also supra notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
172. The OBRA of 1986 made membership in the OPTN mandatory, unifying the na-
tional organ program under UNOS. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
173. See S. REP. No. 382, supra note 84, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3979(noting that "it is timely to direct the development of a national policy regarding the ap-
propriate federal and private sector roles in organ transplantation").
174. See generally OBRA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986); UNITED NETWORK FOR
ORGAN SHARING BY-LAws (May 1988). The scope of UNOS's authority has given rise to
constitutional questions regarding the power of the federal government to delegate law-
making or rulemaking authority to a private interest. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 476.
175. In addition, the complex legal issue of the commerciality of the human body does
not require resolution for the death benefit program to be enacted. It is already settled law
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Administration of the death benefit program could occur under the ex-
isting national organ network with UNOS providing oversight and en-
forcement. 176 Payment of the death benefit to the donor family would be
conducted as part of the present OPO organ procurement cost reim-
bursement process. 177 The regional OPOs would disburse the death ben-
efit payment to the families, acquire and transfer the organs to the
recipients, and then seek reimbursement from the OPTN (i.e., UNOS)
for its incurred costs. 178 This procedure could become part of the present
OPO organ procurement cost reimbursement process with the singular
addition of payment to the donor's family.179 The central regulation and
administration of the death benefit, controlled by federal law and super-
vised by UNOS, would act to eliminate any undesirable commercial pay-
ment practices from the procurement process. 80
A standard payment of $1,000 through the UNOS system, although
tempting, would not be coercive in nature.' 8 ' Moreover, because pro-
cured organ allocation under the death benefit program is based upon
equitable principles of matching, time waiting, and need, 82 the "death
benefit payment to the donor family would in no way favor those who
could better afford costly medical care. '1 83 To the contrary, one of the
expected benefits of the death benefit program is an increase in the dona-
tion rate among minority populations, which are among the most under-
represented and under-served by the present transplant system. 184 Fi-
nally, there is no evidence that transplant organ quality would deteri6rate
that a surviving family may donate the decedent's organs for transplants. The death bene-
fit is merely an incentive to exercise that right. It in no way creates a new commercial
property right in the decedent's remains. Cf., e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477
(6th Cir. 1991); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
176. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. OPO cost accounting "would treat the death benefit payment to the enabling fam-
ily member no differently than it treats payment to the recovery surgeon, charter aircraft
owner, or any other individual involved in the organ procurement and distribution pro-
cess." Id.
180. Id. Organ brokering and commercialization are the main concerns, but their via-
bility depends upon a market system. The death benefit would not permit development of
such a market system. See also Blair & Kasserman, supra note 37, at 417 (detailing the
market dynamics at work within the organ transplant system).
181. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304; Blair & Kasserman, supra note 37, at 417.
182. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304; Blair & Kasserman, supra note 37, at 417.
183. Peters, supra note 42, at 1303; Blair & Kasserman, supra note 37, at 417.
184. "The matching process involves immunologic determinations that are related, at
least in part, to race." Peters, supra note 42, at 1303.
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under the death benefit payment program.'8 5 The stringent medical cri-
teria surrounding donor qualification would not be altered, and "cadav-
eric organ recovery is a one time event, not a habitual income-producing
situation as in the skid-row blood donor."'18 6
The death benefit pilot program would also study the economic impact
of the death benefit payment upon the current organ procurement sys-
tem.'8 7 "Whether implicit or explicit, the cost utility of financial incen-
tives must be established before full-scale implementation. 1 8 8 It is
estimated that operation of the death benefit program would cost up to
$4 million annually. 189 However, that amount does not take into account
the cost savings that may result from an increased organ supply.'"
If more organs were obtained through death benefit payment,
the increased efficiency and use of nonexpendable resources
(fixed costs) would promote an economy of scale diminishing
some costs per organ recovered. Few organ procurement orga-
nizations are busy enough that they have made the best use of
their fixed resources. In addition, it is clearly recognized that
successful renal transplantation is far more cost-effective than
continued dialysis treatment. Any pilot project to study the fis-
cal effects of the death benefit payment to families of organ do-
nors should take into account the cost savings resulting from
increased renal transplantation [versus] dialysis therapy.' 9'
In addition, funds that presently go to OPOs as implicit incentives for
increased organ acquisitions could be set aside in order to defray the ex-
pense of a death benefit payment program, thereby further augmenting
the program's cost effectiveness.' 92 Overall, the significant lifesaving
benefits of the death benefit program far outweigh the slight cost increase
to the current procurement system.' 93 Already, "[o]ne is struck by the
185. Id.
186. Id. Similarly, the Mayo Clinic financially compensated approximately 60% of its
blood donors between 1966 and 1970. Its patients had a remarkably low rate of "post-
transfusion" hepatitis. Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1624.
187. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
188. Evans, supra note 36, at 3117.
189. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
190. Id. But see Evans, supra note 4, at 245 (noting the debate concerning the high
expense of organ transplantation and its relative worth to society, with or without the ad-
ded expense of the financial incentive).
191. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
192. The financial incentive to the OPOs results from the extensive markup of organ
acquisition costs for reimbursement to the transplant hospitals. See Evans, supra note 36,
at 3117.
193. See Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 1629.
When Push Comes to Shove
high level of organ procurement charges in spite of the characterization
of organ procurement as altruistic."' 94 With an estimated average cost of
$30,000 to $40,000 per transplant procedure, an additional $1,000 (the
cost of the death benefit payment) increases the total cost per procedure
by about four percent.'95 Finally, instituting a limited death benefit pilot
program would pose only a minor risk to the stability of the national or-
gan procurement and distribution system. If the pilot program failed to
conclusively demonstrate that the death benefit payment significantly in-
creases the actual number of organs procured, the program could be
ended with its participants reverting to the traditional methods of organ
procurement, thereby leaving the current system undisturbed.' 96 Con-
trast this risk with the lives that may be saved if it works.'9 7
V. CONCLUSION
The death benefit proposal, if developed in the manner proposed
above, can exist within the accepted legal and ethical boundaries that
govern the national organ system. When push comes to shove, we as a
society cannot focus our concerns on some abstract and philosophic
moral imperative such as altruism while ignoring our collective responsi-
bility to maximize lifesaving transplant organ recovery.' 98 It is recog-
nized that organ brokerage cannot be allowed, and that the organ
allocation system must be used fairly for all patients in need of a trans-
plant. Compensating families for their donation of cadaveric organs
could produce more organs. Those organs will save people who are, right
now, literally dying to receive them.' 99
John A. Sten
194. Sloan, supra note 36, at 3155.
195. Evans, supra note 36, at 3116 tbl.6. This figure does not include the potential sav-
ings from the diversion of OPO financial incentive funds to the death benefit program.
See, e.g., Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
196. Peters, supra note 42, at 1304.
197. Id. at 1302.
198. Id. at 1305.
199. Id.
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